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ABSTRACT
After two decades of performing numerous studies on various
space station concepts, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) appears likely to achieve an initial
"permanent manned presence* in space by the end of this decade.
Although the government would play ar active role in the
development of any space operations base, private investment in a
manned space station may represent a viable alternative to
complete government sponsorship of such a program. Since
private-sector interest in space stations is likely tc increase
as the public strengthens its commitment to maintaining a manned
presence in space, it is desirable that NASA and other government
agencies understand the implications of manned space operations
from a business perspective. This report outlines the most
significant problems which would be faced by a private company
involved in a space station enterprise, and suggests possible
government roles in helping to overcome these difficulties.
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I. Introduction
The expected need for a permanently-manned space station by
	
t
the end of this decade presents an intriguing opportunity for
American industry. The first company or companies to own and
operate a space station could be in a position to play a
leadership role in all aspects of space industrialization, a
high-technology field of emerging importance. A space station
could play a pivotal role in the development of space
communications and materials processing in space, both of which
are expected to become multi-billion dollar industries by the
1990s, and might also have business applications in the areas of
life science, space energy and transportation systems, and space
defense systems. These activities could represent a combined
profit potential of close to $3 billion annually in space station
support services by the end of this century.l
The barriers to commercial investment in a space station,
however, are formidable. Judged by almost any commonly accepted
business standard, a space staion would be a high-risk venture
with potential for large financial losses. Such an endeavor
would also raise a wide range of sensitive political and social
issues, creating unique problems which would require equally
visionary solutions. For a vast majority of free-market players,
these barriers are sufficient to discourage any large investment
in a manned space station.
For these reasons it is unlikely that a space station could
-1-
be built without considerable support from the government. This
raises still another important issue: to what extent should the
government provide incentives to attract private investment in
space projects? While on the one hand space is being touted as
the site of an impending "third industrial revolution," it is
also true that premature development of space resources by the
private sector could have serious adverse consequences. The
argument for private investment in space is that it will help to
establish an industry which is sensitive to actual market
conditions, i.e., the needs of the people. Yet if the government
steps in to make such investment possible, the industry which is
spawned could be more responsive to the government incentives
than to the underlying reasons for the incentives. A period of
rapid, artificially stimulated growth could thus be followed by
stagnation and continued dependence on government intervention.
The railroad and automobile industries are excellent examples of
this unfortunate phenomenon.2
This report will not fully answer the question of whether
the government should actively stimulate private investment in
space. It will, however, take a necessary first step in thi-
direction by defining the barriers to investment, and suggesting
steps the government might need to take in order to reduce these
obstacles. Before we attempt to decide what the government
should do to increase the attractiveness of space investments, we
must understand the bases on which such investment opportunities
are judged. This will lead to a recognition of those relevant
actions the government is capable of taking to encourage such
-2-
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investments, a requisite understanding for deciding if such
actions are warranted.
Investment Considerations
No-it business opportunities are judged according to three
primary considerations. These are the amount of money invested
and recovered, the expected time over which the returns accrue,
and the level of risk in the investment. 3 Although the primary
attraction of the space station is its potential for large
economic returns, particularly in the long-term, the investment
required would also be tremendous, perhaps as great as for any
single privately-financed project in American history. Estimates
of the total cost of a space station range from $2 billion to
over $20 billion, depending on the configuration of the facility
and the mode of financing. 4 Even at the lower end of this range,
the financial, liability involved in such a venture would be
enormous.
On the basis of the second investment parameter, investment
horizon (also referred to as "payback period"), the space station
investment opportunity is equally suspect. Space operations
would probably not begin to generate revenue until five to ten
years after the initial investment in the space station, and
investment recovery ("break-even") would probably take at least
ten to fifteen years. By comparison, most venture capitalists
require not only economic recovery, but an extremely high return
on their investment, within a period of three to five years.5
Expectations of paybacks two or three times the size of the
-3-
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initial investment within a period of five years or less, are not
unheard of in the venture capital industry.
The greatest obstacle to private financing of a space
station, however, is risk. There are five major types of risk
associated with large investments: technical risk, market risk,
financial risk, institutional risk, and business risk. 6 With
regard to four of these five factors (business risk is detrmined
by internal organizational characteristics and will not be
considered here, the other four factors will be discussed in
greater detail in Section III) a space station enterprise could
only be characterized as a high-risk venture. Although there are
many actions a company could take to minimize risk (whereas
investment level and payback period are relatively fixed
requirements) , the high levels of perceived and actual risk
involved in a space station enterprise are the most critical
factors to be dealt with in order to make such a project
commercially feasible.
In addition to these "investment-specific" factors, there
are other general conditions which could influence the prospects
for success in a space station investment. These include
primarily economic factors such as inflation and the rate of
interest, and also include such less obvious conditions as anti-
trust and appropriate regulatory laws, government appropriations
for space activities, and national security considerations. The
following three sections provide more detailed discussion of all
of these factors, as well as recommendations on how the
I	 government can act to reduce the dissuasive effect of these
factors on private investment in space operations.
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II. Space Station - Investment Level and Investment Horizon
The most obvious deterrent to private financing of a space
station is the enormous cost which such a project would entail.
The multibillion dollar price tag of a space station would exceed
the average venture capital investment of one to two million
dollars by a factor of several thousand, 7 and could even rival
the $10 billion cost of the trans-Alaska Pipeline, the most
expensive privately-financed project to date. Even if there were
very little risk involved in such a venture, financing of a
manned space facility by private sources would represent an
unusually bold and complex business enterprise, which would
require new and innovative government/industry relationships.
It is difficult to pinpoint the minimum investment which
would be required to initiate profit-making space operations.
Space station cost estimates made by NASA and other government
agencies do not necessarily reflect the levels of investment
which would be required if such a project were built privately,
since the mode of financing has a significant impact on project
cost. Recent NASA estimates of space station costs can be
useful, however, in developing first-order assessments of
investment requirements.
The least expensive design concept under consideration at
NASA is the "minimum space station," estimated to cost about
$2 billion. As its name suggests, however, the minimum space
station would be a relatively simple and limited facility.
-5-
Consisting only of a small three-man habitation module and
perhaps one or two other small compartments for science
experiments, the minimum space station would have little, if any
commercial value. A space station capable of generating
sufficient revenue to turn a profit would probably more closely
resemble the 8-man "Operational"-phase Space Operations Center
(SOC) , which Boeing has estimated would cost NASA about $8.0
billion. 8 The Operational SOC would include logistics and
service modules for space science experiments and materials
processing, and facilities for basing at the SOC a fleet of
reusable chemical-propulsion orbital transfer vehicles (OTVs).
The OTVs would carry payloads from the low-orbit SOC to higher
orbits, and might generate substantial revenue by delivering
communications satellites to geosynchronous orbits. The SOC-OTVs
could also be involved in the potentially lucrative business of
satellite-servicing and retrieval. Although satellites become
obsolete relatively rapidly, retrieval and reuse of expensive
satellite components could be highly cost-effective.9
At present these appear to be the most marketable services
which a space station could provide. A space station could
provide space science services, for which the government would be
a primary consumer, with greater capabilities than the
Shuttle-Spacelab configuration, and at a lower cost. Space
station materials processing capabilities could be attractive to
certain private users, such as McDonnell-Douglas Corporation,
which anticipates the development of a multi-billion dollar
market for space-processed pharmaceutical products by the 1990s.
-6-
cA fleet of reusable OTVs based at a space station might provide
launch services marketable in both the public and private
sectors. On the order of five hundred communications satellites
may be launched into geosynchronous orbit over the next twenty
years, and theoretically nearly all could be placed in their
proper orbits via space-based OTVs. The government, in
particular the Department of Defense, might also require launch
capabilities to geosynchronous orbit which could be provided by a
space-based OTV fleet.
With the cost of the Shuttle flights required for deployment
of the SOC included, the total investment required for achieving
the operational capability just described would be about $6-10
billion, spread out over a five to ten year period. Clearly the
magnitude and timing of this investment limit the range of
possible participants in a space station venture. If the
Operational SOC were developed privately, the costs and
investment horizon could perhaps be reduced significantly by
circumventing bureaucratic regulations and inefficiencies
frequently associated with large government projects. In such an
optimistic case, however, the investment requirements would still
be prohibitive by any business standard. Even at $3-billion, for
example, a fully operational space station would still be beyond
the means of most private investors, and nearly a hundred times
more expensive than the largest venture capital enterprise ever
undertaken. 10
Although a fully private undertaking of such a venture
cannot be completely ruled out, it is almost certain that the 	 .
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government would in some sense have to be a "partner" in such an
enterprise. In fact, there are numerous incentives which could
be provided by the government to reduce space station investment
requirements, perhaps to within acceptable ranges. NASA could,
for example, develop a space station "core," consisting of
habitation modules, solar power arrays, and communications
equipment. A private company could then add to the space station
core the specific facilities required for doing business in
space. A space science module could perhaps be added at a cost
of $500 million to $1 billion. A commercial materials processing
facility might be provided for half as much. Development of an
OTV and OTV support equipment could probably be achieved
privately for $1-1.5 billion. A company could therefore provide
services on a space station for an investment as small as 5-101
($50OM/$10B - 5%) of the cost of a full NASA space station.
Thus, the cost of developing these service capabilities
independently are well within the means of private investors.
Another joint-venture scenario might call for the government
to perform the research and development required for a space
station, with private companies responsible for production and
operation of the station. Contractors could perhaps finance
production of some of the required space station hardware with
profits earned by designing the components for NASA. In exchange
for sponsoring the initial design and development, NASA might
require owner-operators of the space station to provide services
to the government at a reduced rate. Such an arrangement could
reduce space station investment requirements to acceptable levels
-8-
because the actual hardware production would comprise only about
30-50% of the total space station cost.11
Joint public-private ventures of this nature would raise a
number of new policy problems for the government, but through its
3
Joint-Endeavor and other programs NASA has demonstrated an
ability and willingness to work with private companies toward
common goals in creative ways. Joint arrangements for space
station development could be attractive from the government's
viewpoint because they might reduce the appropriations required
to establish manned space operations. This would free funds for
space station utilization; a major problem with the Space Shuttle
is that its high development costs have limited NASA's ability to
design uses for it. (The Space Shuttle presently consumes nearly
two-thirds of NASA's research and development budget12).
Moreover, private investment in a space station could be a
significant first step toward the establishment of a new,
space-based industry with a large tax base and other social
benefits. Reducing the investment requirements for space station
operations to acceptable business levels might therefore be
within the means and in the interests of the U.S. Government.
-9-
III. Space Station - Risk
Risk is by far the greatest impediment to private investment
in a space station. The high cost of a space station could be
considered acceptable for investment purposes if the risks
involved in such a venture were sufficiently small. As mentioned
earlier, the degree of risk in a space station venture is
tremendously high with respect to the four major types of
investment risk considered here: technical risk, market risk,
financial risk, and institutional risk. it is almost certain
that the government's assistance would be needed in order to
reduce the risks in a space station enterprise to acceptable
business levels.
This dependence on the government, however, would in itself
represent a significant risk; as a partner in a long-term space
station enterprise the government would be highly suspect. For
example, a government delay in providing expected support during
space station development, such as NASA's two-year delay in
developing the Space Shuttle, could spell disaster for the
private partners in such a venture. A change in presidential
administrations, or a key NASA personnel change, could also
adversely affect the government's ability to follow through on
such a long-term commitment. For reasons such as these, any
joint private-public venture would need to be backed up by firm
agreements, where all parties (including the government) would be
legally bound to meet their obligations. Special legislation
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might even be required to ensure the availability of government
funds for the duration of the project. From the viewpoint of any
private partner, the government's involvement in a space station
enterprise would paradoxically be necessary for reducing risks,
but also a substantial risk in itself. This chapter deals with
many of the types of risk which would be involved in a space
station venture, and the ways in which the government might need
to be involved in order to diminish these risks.
Technical Risk
Technical risk involves all uncertainties with regard to how
well a product will function. A space station involving
thousands of complex technological components functioning in a
hostile and unforgiving environment would entail possibly the
greatest technical risk of any private project ever undertaken.
Not only would the possibilities for technological, scientific,
or human failures be great, but the costs associated with such
treakdowns could also be enormous. Particularly in a private
space enterprise, the temptation to cut costs and achieve quick
results would be great, exacerbating the problem of technical
failure.
Through its ongoing research and develoMent programs the
government is constantly working to reduce the technical risks
which such projects usually entail, and the benefits of this
baseline work would almost certainly be available to private
organizations involved in a space station enterprise. Beyond
this, the government could set up a program within NASA to assist
C.
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3the private sector in evaluating and overcoming the technical
risks involved in early space operations. Such a program could
help transfer technical knowledge and expertise from NASA and
high-technology industries to a broader cross-section of
potential investors, with the specific goal of maximizing the
private sector's contribution to (and benefit from) manned space
operations. Such a program would probably be most effective in
providing potential investors with an initial basic familiarity
with space investment opportunities, since investors with limited
technical expertise or R&D facilities would probably ultimately
contract development work out to better-equipped companies such
as aerospace firms.
Market Risk
Whereas technical risk is the risk associated with creation
of a product or service (supply), market risk is the risk
involved in selling a product (demand). The development of any
commodity or service is always preceeded by some type of market
analysis to define such factors as total product demand, price
sensitivities, product distribution, and advertising. The market
risk which would be involved in developing space operations is
particularly acute because of the possible emergence of competing
alternative technologies. During the long lead-time preceeding
the operating life of a space station, other means of
accomplishing the space station's intended tasks could be
developed. NASA's Materials Processing in Space program has
demonstrated, for example, that improved ground-based processes
-12-
may frequently compete effectively with space processes. This
could also happen in other areas critical to the success of a
space station, such as space transportation. During the long
development time of the Space Shuttle, the European Space Agency
developed a strong competitor for commercial launcn services: the
Ariane expendable launch vehicle. Since materials processing and
space transportation could be two of the major services which a
space station would provide, these examples are particularly
meaningful.
The possible emergence of competing ground-based
technologies is only one of many important elements of space
station mission modeling and marketing which require extensive
further study. Previous studies of space station uses have
focused almost exclusively on technological capabilities, without
ever addressing the question of who would pay for space station
services. This is perhaps because it is exceedingly difficult
and risky to forecast demand functions for commodities and
services which do not yet exist.
Another type of market risk which should be examined regards
the ability of users to pay for space operations. In the absence
of competing technologies, the demand for space station services
might be fairly inelastic over a certain price range (i.e. not
very responsive to changes in price), but at some point demand
could suddenly drop dramatically given any additional price
increases. The advantage of manufacturing certain high-value
products in space, for example, might be so great that relatively
large increases in the cost of space processing would not deter
s
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investors from using a space station's processing facility. As
the cost of space production increases, however, a point may be
reached beyond which Earth-based processes are more economical.
(See Figure 1). In the case of such revolutionary services as
space operations, it is particularly difficult to determine where
such break-points in product demand will occur.
The government might play a key role in reducing market risk
by essentially guaranteeing a market for certain space station
services. Obviously NASA has a strong interest in utilization of
such a facility or the space agency would not be considering the
development of a space station as a major new project. Instead
of developing a station on its own, NASA could agree to use a
private space station for space science services, for example,
and promise to pay a certain sum of money to the space station
operators annually. Use of a space station for science could
possibly save the government several billion dollars over an
extended period, so the value of such a market guarantee t ,.) the
government could be considerable. 13 Similarly, the government
could agree to utilize other space station services, such as OTV
flight support for NASA payloads.
Contracting to "rent" the services of a privately-owned
space station as needed might be more cost-effective for the
government than building and operating the entire space station,
and would eliminate a large degree of market risk for the private
owners. Although such a market guarantee would raise legal
issues concerning government procurement practices and creation
of monopoly conditions, there are precedents for such
-14-
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government-guaranteed markets, most notably the Terrestrial Data
Reiay Satellite System (TDRSS) . The TDRSS was developed
privately and will be leased by NASA for a ten-year period
beginning in 1983 for approximately $2.3 billion.14
From the perspective of a private space station operator,
government use of a space station could present another marketing
problem. The government would probably desire priority over
other space station users during times of national emergency; the
possibility of such a government "priority override" might create
problems for commercial users. This is another issue regarding
government support and use of privately owned space facilities
which requires further study.
Financial Risk
Financial risk, another important element of r=sk in
business ventures, is the uncertainty pertaining to the
investment level and payback period. These aspects of a space
station venture, which were discussed in the previous section,
represent a high degree of perceived risk for such an endeavor,
primarily because of the enormous up-front investment which would
be required before any profits could be realized. In the case of
a space station, financial risk would also include the great
ranges of uncertainty regarding development and operating costs,
which in such high-technology projects often exceed initial
expected by large margins. Financial risk would also be
exacerbated by the long lead-time preceeding actual space station
operations. In one sense, however, the space station venture
-16-
fares favorably with regard to financial risk. The very high
long-term potential for financial gain is a primary reason that
businessmen may ultimately be willing to face the risks involved
in a space station venture.
The government's role in reducing financial risk would
probably be limited. Financial risk is a primary "acid-test" for
investment opportunities, since it bridges the requirements of
investment level and risk management. The government could only
influence financial risk by altering the nature of the business
task itself, i.e., by sharing the cost of building a space
station with the private sector. By developing a space station
core, for example, the government might substantially reduce the
amount of hardware a company would have to provide, and hence the
investment required for initiating marketable space operations.
Institutional Risk
The most critical area of government involvement in a
private space station enterprise would be with regard to
institutional risk. This is the risk associated with the
logistical support services and equipment necessary to carry out
a designated task. Institutional risk also encompasses a broad
spectrum of uncertainties with regard to the economy, legal
rulings, taxes, the availability of government support, and other
factors. Institutional risk is in fact the one area in which
government cooperation, or at the very least non-interference, is
essential to the success of a private space station venture.
As a major example, it would be the government's duty to
-17-
ensure the availability of the Space Shuttle flights required for
space station deployment, support, and operations, since NASA is
the sole operator of the Shuttle. Uncertainties regarding the
availability and cost of Shuttle flights are in fact often cited
as primary factors in the reluctance of businessmen to become
involved in space development. NASA's Joint-Endeavor program,
which offers free Shuttle flights and other services to companies
which are willing to explore new markets for space products, has
to date attracted only three industry participants. A primary
reason for this is that in Joint-Endeavor Agreements NASA can
only promise to use its "best efforts" to meet the industry
participant's Shuttle flight requirements. 15 Maintaining an
affordable and reliable fleet of operational Shuttle Orbiters,
one of NASA's major agency goals of this decade, will be critical
to the management of institutional risk in all types of space
endeavors.
Government tax incentives (and disincentives) could also
play a great role in determining whether a space station project
would represent an acceptable risk to the private sector.
Although the government would expect space-based industries to
ultimately provide a large tax base, temporary tax incentives
during the embryonic years of space development might be a
pre-requisite for private investment in such activities. During
the development phase, tax credits for research and development
expenditures could reduce the investment requirements for such a
project considerably. During the early operational stages, tax
incentives for operators could reduce financial risk, and tax
-18-
breaks for space station users could reduce market risks. These
tax incentives could be phased out as the market for space
operations develops, and tax revenues from space operations could
eventually far exceed the value of the early tax breaks.
Other relevant government actions which would influence
institutional risk include anti-trust rulings, environmental and
safety regulations, and even international agreements regarding
the use of space (although no such agreements have yet been
ratified within the U.S.). Department of Defense interests in a
private space station are another institutional matter to be
considered; the military could become a major customer for space
station services, or might alternatively deem private ownership
of such a facility a threat to national security. The status of
a privately-owned space station vis-a-vis the military would have
to be determined at the earliest possible time.
-19-
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IV. Space Station - Other Considerations
The attractiveness of a space station venture to the
investment community shall be judged over the next several years
primarily on the basis of the factors discussed in the previous
two sections. Clearly these are but a few of the many important
considerations affecting a project of such magnitude and scope.
The government will have ample opportunity to influence investor
attitudes toward the marketing of space operations, becoming, to
a certain extent, a partner in any space station enterprise.
In addition to the investment and risk considerations
previously discussed, there will be a number of other factors
affecting space station investment decisions over which the
government and industry will have little control. One such
factor is the rate of interest. When the rate of interest is
high, as it is now, long-term projects become unattractive
relative to short-term business ventures. The discounted
present-value of any income stream rapidly approaches zero, due
to the oppportunity cost of forgoing other high-yield
investments.
Consider, for example, the income streams of two
hypothetical investment opportunities (See Figure 3) . Option A
is a short-term project requiring an investment of $200 million
per year over five years (years 1 through 5), and yielding an
income of $300 million annually over the following five years
(years 6 through 10) . Option B is a longer-term investment
_M
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E	 opportunity requiring an outlay of $200 million per year over ten
s
	
	
years (years 1 through 10), with a payback of $800 million per
annum during the five years afterward (years 11 through 15). The
undiscounted present values of Options A and B are $0.5 billion
and $2.0 billion respectively, that is, if the interest rate were
zero, the value of Option A would be $0.5 billion, and Option B
would be worth $2.0 billion. With an interest rate of zero,
Option B (the long-term investment) would clearly be the better
opportunity, with four times the value of Option A.
Consider what happens, however, as the interest rate rises.
At an interest rate of 51, the discounted present value of Option
A is $151 million, and Option B is worth $582 million. The
long-term investment is still superior, although the value of
each investment is less than one-third of its undiscounted value.
If the interest rate were to rise further to 10%, the present
value of each investment would drop below zero, and Option B
(present value: -$59 million) would no longer be superior to
Option A (-$52 million). Similarly, a long-term space station
project ihich appears attractive relative to other investment
opportunities when the prevailing interest rates are low might be
less attractive, and perhaps highly unprofitable, at higher rates
of interest.
The rate of inflation is another factor which would
influence the attractiveness of a space station enterprise. By
the time a space station becomes operational, its services might
be far more expensive to provide than originally anticipated.
The cost of a Space Shuttle flight, as an example, will probably
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be several times more expensive than was originally expected, due
to the combined effects of the general inflation rate and real
increases (over the rate of inflation) in the cost of the
program. The aggregate impact of the inflation rate and real
cost overruns could similarly reduce the profitability and
attractiveness of a space station venture.
Any entrepeneurs considering a space station investment
would also need to consider their enterprise from a non-business
perspective. The social costs and value of such a project would
have to be taken into account, especially in light of the
government support which would undoubtedly be sought by any
investors in such an enterprise. NASA, for example, would
probably be more inclined to support an effort to produce
life-saving drugs in space than to support a scheme to
manufacture "space-jewelry" or other novelty items. In a broader
sense, entrepeneurs proposing to "help" NASA to build a space
station would almost certainly be asked to demonstrate how their
participation in such a project would benefit space station users
or the general public.
A space station venture unlikely to generate benefits for
society would probably receive little or no support from NASA or
other government agencies, and might even run into government or
t	 public opposition. Competing efforts from more public-minded
private investors might further undermine an endeavor which
failed to reflect the public interest. ,lust as NASA would
require insight into the businessman's perspectives on such a
project, the private sector would need to be sensitive to NASA's
public mandate in order to work effectively with the government
on such a project.
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V. Summary
The investment level, risk management, and other
considerations outlined in this report provide a lens through
which the space station concept can be viewed from a business
perspective. Government and industry should work together over
the next several years to focus this lens, to determine the most
effective private sector role in space station development. The
next step in this process is for interested organizations in
private industry to evaluate the space station as a business
venture, an exercise which would assess the interplay of the
factors described in this report, and which would be aimed at
ultimately calculating the return on investment, the bottom line
in any business plan. Whether or not private industry becomes
actively involved in early space station programs, the government
should adopt creative and flexible development strategies in
order to maximize the opportunities for industry involvement in
all phases of space station activities. The government is likely
to find that, as its commitment to a manned space station becomes
stronger, private-sector interest in space operations will also
increase. When industry picks up the initiative, the U.S.
Government should be supportive, since every dollar contributed
by the private sector represents money potentially saved by the
taxpayers, as well as a small step in the direction of space
industrialization.
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